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The UK’s referendum will not only have an impact on Britain, but also on the rest of the European
Union. As part of our series covering views on the referendum across Europe, Salvador Llaudes
assesses the perspective of the Spanish government and Spanish citizens on a potential Brexit.
Internal tensions pushed David Cameron to launch the risky wager of undertaking a referendum on
EU membership before the end of 2017. Leaders only use this mechanism, which often has a
polarising eﬀect on the electorate, when they are sure of attaining a clear victory. Following this
same logic, after his successful experiences of 2011 (the referendum on the ‘alternative vote’
electoral system) and 2014 (the referendum on Scottish independence), Cameron has seen himself as having
enough leverage to call a new plebiscite that could solve the relationship between the UK and the EU for at least a
generation.
The referendum, scheduled for 23 June, will see Cameron ask for a vote in favour of remaining in the European
Union, after months of negotiations with his partners regarding the new nature of the relationship between the two
sides. Donald Tusk played an essential part, in his role as President of the European Council, in the success of the
negotiations. At the same time, countries like France (for her opposition in granting the UK further concessions over
economic governance), Belgium (for her reticence to renounce the principle of “ever closer union”) and most of all,
the Visegrad Group, that is, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary (for their discomfort regarding
proposals concerning social beneﬁts), had a relevant role too.
Of course, only in the case of Britons deciding to stay in the EU, will the agreement come into eﬀect. With the
exception of the section regarding competitiveness, which is more ambiguous and imprecise, the rest (economic
governance, sovereignty and social beneﬁts) will bring about some changes regarding the relationship between the
EU and UK, and will have certain eﬀects on Spain. Though undesirable for a country so ﬁrmly pro-European, these
eﬀects do not have to be particularly dramatic, especially if they do not entail a cascade of petitions to obtain a
singular status from other countries.
The UK’s referendum and Spain
Regarding economic governance, Cameron has obtained the recognition that diﬀerent currencies co-exist in the EU,
but a clear red line for Spain has been salvaged as it is highlighted that the only currency of the EU is the euro.
Likewise, and in this same section, the UK has achieved the creation of a mechanism that guarantees the non-
discrimination of countries outside the Eurozone.
According to this, economic matters that aﬀect the banking union and the internal market can be put forward to the
European Council. Although this does not translate into veto power, depending on how and how frequently it is used,
it could eventually provoke serious diﬃculties when taking decisions. This is clearly against Spain’s interests,
though at the same time, it may pose an opportunity to balance German economic power, given that the British and
Spanish productive models are very similar, due to the export of services, internal demand and the role of the
banking sector.
In terms of national sovereignty, the UK will now have one more singularity: from now on it will be exempt from “ever
closing union” and it will not be obliged to integrate further in the future (there is even a compromise for this to be
reﬂected in an eventual treaty reform). Furthermore, in this sphere, it is important to highlight the assignation of a
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“red-card” to national parliaments, according to which they could veto legislation (although only in the case of 55 per
cent of national parliaments also exercising it). This concession, which would limit the power of legislative initiative of
the Commission, is, in principle, dangerous and undesirable for a country like Spain, which has traditionally had a
weak parliament, especially in the control of foreign aﬀairs. Nevertheless, it could pose an opportunity as an
incentive for the Parliament to establish a network with other national parliaments that hold the same EU
perspective as Spain.
In regards to the last point of the negotiation, countries have decided upon the creation of mechanisms to limit social
beneﬁts, in particular those concerning child beneﬁts and in-work beneﬁts. The introduction of such mechanisms
should not be alarming for Spain given the type of Spanish immigration in the UK – mostly young and without family
burdens. However, the curbing of in-work beneﬁts, which would allow the UK to activate an “emergency brake” for
seven years to limit the social beneﬁt claims of EU migrants, is potentially more harmful.
Nevertheless, this would not apply to those already residing in the UK (around 200,000 Spaniards according to
oﬃcial ﬁgures, of which, barely 1 per cent are social beneﬁt claimants) and, if the economic situation in Spain
continues to improve, the migration rate is expected to decrease. Likewise, Spain is the EU country with which the
UK has the most favourable relations in terms of migration, given that the lowest estimates point to 300,000 Britons
residing in Spain. This oﬀers a certain guarantee against the discriminatory treatment of Spaniards in the UK.
Which way the vote will go is a decision now in the hands of the British people. As in other referendums, what is
relevant is whether citizens are replying to the question set, or whether other factors such as their trust in the current
government or their views on the negotiations play a role in shaping opinions. Should the UK opt to leave it would
certainly be more costly for Spain and the EU as a whole (not to mention the UK itself).
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